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ABSTRACT

Attribution theory research has been criticized for minimizing the influences of social structure variables on individuals. The role of social factors in attributions was explored with 90 females and 50 males who, after reading interviews between police and assault victims, made attributions of blame about different types of assault. The influences of victim gender, respondent gender, type of assault (rape vs. robbery) and situation (hitchhiking vs. jogging) on respondent attributions of blame for an assault were examined. Attributions to the assailant, the victim, social factors, and fate were assessed. Respondents blamed female more than male victims, victims of robbery more than victims of rape, and victims attacked while hitchhiking more than victims attacked while jogging. Interaction effects consistent with stereotypes about "appropriate" gender-related behaviors were also obtained. Examination of subjects' perceptions about the role of social factors in causing rape and robbery suggested that robbery was perceived as more deeply embedded in the social context than was rape. Social norms about appropriate behaviors for women and men and the social stereotypes about females and males were powerful guides to attributions of blame for several types of victimization.
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**Rape: The Role of Societal Norms and the
Psychological Need for Control in the Attribution of Blame**

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Rape: The Role of Societal Norms and the Psychological Need for Control in the Attribution of Blame

Attribution theory is currently one of the most popular areas of research in social psychology (Richardson, Tomarelli and Hendrickson, 1978). As such, the relatively few major models of attribution have had great influence in shaping the nature of questions asked - and not asked - and the scope or generalizability of a large body of research. Attribution theory was one of several strains of cognitive psychology originating in the post-Lewinian era of the late 1950s, and thus stands as no exception from the biases which have been cited as characteristic of this era of social psychology. The central criticisms are that the research relies too heavily on experimental, laboratory methods (Gergen, 1976), that the theory is ahistoric (Gergen, 1973, 1976), and that the influences of social structure variables on individuals tend to be minimized (House, 1977). The research reported in this paper is an attempt to illustrate the accuracy of the third criticism, the root of this criticism in social structural characteristics, and the negative impact of such an omission on both individuals and groups. The study also points to ways of correcting this limitation within the theoretical domain of attribution.

Attribution Research

A Model of Attribution

Attribution is the process of seeking causal explanations for the various events which occur in the course of day-to-day living. When a person is shunned by a friend, does superbly on a test, or is victimized, he or she probably asks why: that is, the person makes an attribution. The original models of attribution were limited to identification of

immediate causal factors and to the exploration of the information processing rules which are thought to guide the attribution of an event to a particular causal factor (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). Little attention was paid either to the distal antecedents of attribution (Brickman, Ryan and Wortman, 1975) or to the wide variety of possible consequences of attribution; affective consequences in particular were virtually ignored.

A more comprehensive and processual model of attribution has been proposed and elaborated by Bernard Weiner (1974; Weiner, Russell and Lerman, 1978) in a series of papers (figure 1). The first set of variables in the model includes attributional antecedents, variables which influence the choice of a causal factor to which to attribute the cause of some event. The set of antecedent factors includes (but is not limited to) personality variables such as one's self esteem, situational variables such as the time of day, or physical location, and social factors such as stereotypes and social norms. The several covariations between persons, stimuli and modalities described in Kelley's (1967) attribution cube are other examples of situational and social antecedents. These various antecedents are not equally easily identified. While some of these factors are both specific and immediate (e.g., situational factors), others may be both general and distal, hence less salient.

The second set of variables in the model includes those rules of information processing by which we are thought to combine the various antecedents to make attributions (Kelley, 1967). The results of these information syntheses are attributions to one or more of the potential causal factors. The original set of factors was proposed by Fritz Heider

in 1958 and was not systematically expanded until Weiner (1974) developed this model. Ability, effort, task difficulty and luck are the four causal factors first proposed. Weiner's (1974) model adds factors such as others' biases, motivation or effort, as well as factors such as mood and fatigue.

The next set of variables includes the causal dimensions, ways of understanding the implications of attributions to particular factors. That is, the set of causal dimensions is essentially an analytic device by which each causal factor can be described. The standing of a factor on the several dimensions determines the implications an attribution to this factor has for cognitions, emotions and future behavior. The three dimensions identified by Weiner (1974) are the locus of control, stability and intentionality.

The early models of attribution focused only on the locus of control, the distinction between those causes of behavior located internally, that is, within the actor, and those causes of behavior located externally, outside the actor. The importance of this distinction lies in the hypothesis of differential impacts of attribution upon future behavior for internal as opposed to external attributions. The term locus of control was coined originally by Julian Rotter (1966), a social learning theorist who defined the dimension as the perceived contingency between one's actions and the outcomes of those actions. Thus Rotter originally conceptualized this perceived action-outcome contingency as a manipulable and situation-specific characteristic. The locus of control has also been treated as a personality variable. An internally oriented person views outcomes as contingent on

her or his own actions, while an externally oriented person tends to view outcomes as independent of her or his own actions. Thus the locus of control may appear in this model both as an antecedent personality variable and as an attribution-specific causal dimension.

Weiner (1979) recently relabeled this dimension "locus", denoting the location of the causal factors as internal or external to a given actor. Pointing out that internal factors are not necessarily controllable, and that external factors are not necessarily uncontrollable, Weiner (1979) suggests that location alone is the meaning of this dimension. Further complicating matters, Weiner (1979) also relabels the intentionality dimension as "controllability." Intentionality, the degree to which a factor is deemed volitional or wilful, has been used to characterize factors such as effort or others' motivation, while factors such as luck or ability are described as unintentional. Noting that a failure one attributes to insufficient effort may well not be intentional, however, Weiner (1979) proposes that the degree of controllability of the factor is the dimension in question. Effort is controllable by the actor, while ability is not (or is at least much less controllable).

The third dimension is stability. Causal factors such as ability and task factors are described as stable; effort and luck are described as less stable, less enduring. Other dimensions have been proposed as well. Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) propose that the generality, universality and chronicity of a causal factor provide further understanding of the attributional implications. Each of these dimensions has certain limitations, however (Howard, 1981).

The final sets of variables in the model include the several types of consequences of attributions. Weiner (1974) conceptualizes cognitive and affective reactions as mediators of behavioral reactions. That is, changes (or lack of change) in outcome expectancies, as well as those emotions elicited by particular attributions, are thought to determine whether and how one behaves in future similar situations.

An illustration may help clarify this process of attribution. Suppose you attribute your failure to get funding for a grant proposal to the inadequacy of the proposal, one you dashed off in a weekend. That is, you attribute your failure to the causal factor of effort, an internal, unstable, controllable factor, and one which assumes a direct relationship between the quality of the proposal and the outcome of no funding. In another situation you may attribute this failure to the sudden and severe decrease in NSF social science funds, an external and hopefully unstable attribution, but one which is not under your own control. In this latter situation you probably believe the proposal is sound and that its quality is not related to the outcome of no funding. Clearly the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences of these two attributions differ. In the first instance you may feel ashamed and chagrined and rush off to write and resubmit a better grant. In the latter you may feel despondent and worried and not bother to try again.

Limitations of Attributional Research

Attribution research was cited above as being rather limited. Placing the extant research in this general and comprehensive model makes particularly salient the prevailing preferences and omissions in this body of

research. In particular, some of these weaknesses are:

(1) Minimization of the role of social variables as antecedent influences on attribution. Most of the research which does address antecedent variables focuses on cognitive/personality constructs or on the immediate situational influences. This tendency is most evident in the prevailing conceptualization of attribution biases, variables which can also be viewed as attributional antecedents. The major review of this area (Ross, 1977) characterizes such biases as either cognitive or motivational. Social factors receive little mention.

(2) Failure to consider the possibility of social meaning in several of the causal dimensions. In particular, the locus dimension has been characterized as bipolar (Rotter, 1966). An external locus denotes the causal factors of fate or immediate task parameters. Causal factors which are external and social (i.e., others' biases) have been either ignored or not distinguished from external and nonsocial or nonhuman factors such as fate (Gurin, Gurin and Morrison, 1979). However, such a distinction may well be meaningful both for the individual and for society.

(3) Lack of attention to emotional, affective reactions to attributions as well as to the influence of emotions both on attributions and on later behavior. The major exception of this criticism is Weiner's own line of research (Weiner et. al., 1978).

(4) Lack of attention to the social consequences of attribution. The parameters of behavioral consequences proposed by Weiner et. al. (1978), for example, clearly refer only to the isolated behavior of the individual actor.

(5) Lack of attention to social interactions. Many behaviors involve more than one actor. Attributional problems involving multiple actors may be rather different from the processes proposed and researched to date.

Rape: An Attributional Problem

The study reported here illustrates the first of these criticisms, pointing to the influence of social variables as antecedents of attribution. The specific behavioral situation involved is the experience of sexual assault. An attributional framework has much relevance for the experience of having been raped. Unexpected, undesired and severe, rape is an experience which victims typically seek to explain (Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Medea and Thompson, 1974).

Rape is particularly well suited to illustrate the effects of the research limitations in attribution noted above. First, the literature on rape makes clear the presence of a strong attribution bias both among rape victims themselves and among others, specifically, the tendency of victims to blame themselves, and of others (both individuals and social institutions) to blame the rape victims (Brownmiller, 1974; Janoff-Bulman, 1979; LeGrand, 1973; Notman and Nadelson, 1976). Janoff-Bulman (1979) suggests that victims prefer to blame their own behaviors as opposed to more enduring personality characteristics. Both the feminist and non-feminist literatures on rape, however, suggest that what Janoff-Bulman calls "characterological" self-blame also occurs frequently. Given that the "objective" situation in a rape is one of unwanted sexual invasion, a highly personal and distressing experience, why victims should blame themselves is a question an attributional model ought to be able to answer.

Second, attempting to account for these attributions of self-blame for rape illustrates that social norms and stereotypes must be included within the set of antecedents to attribution. This argument contradicts,

or at least adds to, a number of established psychological explanations of the parallel phenomena of victim self-blame and of others blaming victims. Lerner's (Lerner and Miller, 1978) just world theory, Walster's (1966) theory that we blame victims to re-assert a belief in our own invulnerability, for example, are psychological and individual-level explanations of why others blame victims. Janoff-Bulman's (1979) theory that victims blame themselves in order to re-establish their belief in control over their specific and personal worlds is also a psychological and individual-level theory. These explanations pay insufficient heed to the strength of the social norms and stereotypes both about women as a gender and about the relationships between women and men (Burt, 1980). Social stereotypes may influence both the tendencies of women to blame themselves and of others to blame victims (Chapman and Gates, 1978; Ryan, 1966). This hypothesis is examined in the study reported below.

Third, the role of emotions in the attribution of blame for a rape illustrates the necessity to include affective variables in the attributional model. The psychiatric literature on rape attests to the unsurprising fact that intense emotions expressed both by the victims and by those close to them are elicited by rape (Sutherland and Scherl, 1970; Notman and Nadelson, 1976). Janoff-Bulman (1979) does not attend sufficiently to these negative emotional consequences of a self-blaming attribution. The need to weigh together both cognitive and emotional consequences of the attribution of blame for a rape suggests that attributions to other factors may be more satisfactory.

Fourth, considering the implications of the attribution of blame for a rape makes clear that a model of the behavioral consequences of attribution ought to include the parameters of social action. Rape can be a deep

consciousness-raising experience. For some women, increased awareness of the collective experience of victimization of women is a direct consequence of sexual assault (Griffin, 1979). One might wonder, however, why this awareness does not follow for all - or at least more - victims of rape. That limited awareness of the influence of social stereotypes in the "real world" which probably explains this gap, is mirrored both in the attribution research and in much of the psychiatric and therapy-oriented literature and research on rape (Notman and Nadelson, 1976; Sutherland and Scherl, 1970). If women who have been raped can learn to make attributions of blame to external and social factors, they may not only avoid the negative internalization of blame but also marshal their personal energies to fight a patriarchal system.

Method

This study explores the role of social factors in attributions others make about women who have been raped. If the major reasons others blame victims include a variety of psychological "needs", and if gender-related social stereotypes and attitude exert little influence, there should be no gender differences when people are asked to make attributions about identical victimization experiences. In other words, "third-party" attributers should not distinguish among victims on the basis of their gender, if their attributions are guided by a need to believe the world is just, or to avoid the implications of personal vulnerability. One might expect that identification with same-sexed victims on the part of the attributer would increase defensiveness and intensify the effects of these

victim-blaming explanations. If so, these effects should be reflected in increased within-gender blaming alone. Attributions characterized either by general gender differences, or cross-gender interactive differences inconsistent with the identification argument would provide some support for the argument that biases consistent with a patriarchal ideology exist in the attribution of blame.

Procedures

Both female (N = 90) and male (N = 50) respondents were asked to make attributions of blame about different types of assault situations. The descriptions of these experiences were ostensibly scripts of interviews between a police detective and the assault victim. The scripts vary in terms of 1) gender of victim (female vs. male); 2) type of assault (rape vs. rob); and 3) situations in which assault occurs (hitchhiking vs. jogging). Each respondent read two scripts, varying only in terms of situation. That is, a given respondent read two interviews with victims of same gender, same type of assault, different situation, assaults.

Respondents were asked then to respond to a series of questions about their own backgrounds and about their responses to the interviews. Specifically, they were asked whether they or their close friends had any personal experience with victimization either by robbery or by assault, and what their perceptions were of the general likelihood of the relevant types of assault as well as of the likelihood that such an assault could happen to them. Additionally, respondents were also asked to make various types of attributions of blame (and of cause - results are

reported for blame only, since the results are virtually identical) with respect to the attacker, the victim, fate, society and situational characteristics, to describe their perceptions of the victim and of the attacker, and to rate the seriousness, believability and intentionality of the assault.

Results

Perceptions of Interview Scripts and Assault Likelihoods

The interview scripts were regarded as very believable ($\bar{X} = 1.78$ on a 7 point scale) and high on three measures of seriousness (severe, $\bar{X} = 1.99$; serious, $\bar{X} = 1.60$; important, $\bar{X} = .896$, on a 7 point scale). The perceived general likelihood of assault was surprisingly high (much higher than actual incidence rates). The general likelihood over all types of assault was rated as 5.896, on a scale from 0 to 9. Robberies were judged significantly more likely than rapes (F levels are reported in Table 1), and women were judged significantly more likely to be victims than men (also an inaccurate perception on terms of incidence rates). Further, type of assault and victim gender interacted as expected. Male rapes were judged least likely, female rapes most likely. Robberies of female victims were judged more likely than robberies of male victims, however, another inaccurate perception.

Perceptions of the likelihood that such an assault could happen to the respondent her or himself were lower, averaging 4.268 for the general likelihood over all assault types. Again, robberies were perceived as more likely to happen to the respondent than were rapes and, more interestingly,

the gender differences reversed. When asked whether the assault could happen to them, women were less likely to answer yes than were men.

Attribution of Blame

Respondents were asked to make attributions of blame on three different types of measures. First, respondents were asked to divide 100% of the blame among four factors, the attacker, the victim, fate and society. Second, they were asked a global question (e.g., "do you think the attacker/social factors/the victim was to blame for this assault?")/ Their responses were ratings on a 9 point scale. Third, they were asked to rate how much to blame (on a 9 point scale) each of 20 factors were for the assault. These responses were factor analyzed, which resulted in multi-item indices of blame attributed to the attacker, the victim, social factors, fate and the situation. These results are organized in terms of the ratings for each potential causal factor, to emphasize the consistency of results over the three types of attributions. (For all results reported below, perceived general likelihood is employed as a covariate, since this variable serves as a potential alternative explanation for several of the results hypothesized and obtained.)

Attacker. Overall, 64.16% of the total blame was attributed to the attacker. There are several interesting effects within this overall level of blame. First, the attacker is blamed significantly more when the victim is male than female. This effect is consistent with the existence of a social bias toward devaluing women. Second, the attacker is blamed more when the victim was jogging than when she or he was hitchhiking, an effect

consistent with general social norms about hitchhiking. Third, the attacker is blamed more for a rape than for a robbery. This effect suggests that rape may be viewed generally as a more serious offense than robbery. Fourth, the attacker is blamed more by male than by female respondents. (All cell means are reported in Table 1.)

On the global measure, the attribution of blame to the attacker was very high, averaging 7.88 on a 9 point scale. The effects for this measure were consistent with those found for the percentage item. First, as with the percentage items, the attacker is blamed significantly more when the victim is a male than a female. Second, type of assault and gender of victim interact such that the attacker is blamed most for raping a male and least for raping a female. This effect is perfectly consistent with the stereotypes noted above. Third, type of assault and gender of respondent interact such that males blame the attacker more for rapes, while females blame the attacker more for robberies, less for rapes. This effect suggests some evidence of internalization of guilt among female respondents, an explanation which receives further confirmation in other results mentioned below. Fourth, there is an almost significant interaction between situation and gender of victim ($p = .076$) such that the attacker is blamed most for assaulting a hitchhiking male and least for attacking a hitchhiking woman. This effect suggests that the norms about appropriate independent behaviors for women and men differ sharply.

There are four specific items which assess attacker blame; these include the attacker's upbringing, his mental condition, his need for sex/money, and his aggressive personality. The overall level of blame for this index is

5.89 on a 9 point scale. It is notable that the level of attacker blame is almost two full points lower on a multi-item index than on a global measure, which might elicit greater concern with social desirability than the multi-item index. The effects found with this index were similar to those reported for the two other measures. First, the attacker is blamed more for assault of male than female victims. Second, the attacker is blamed more for rapes than for robberies. Third, the attacker is blamed more for rapes than for robberies.

Two interactions also emerged. The gender of victim and of respondents interact such that male respondents blame the attacker more for assaulting a female, while females respondents blamed the attacker more for assaulting a male victim. Given the social roles of women and men, the responses of men might reflect "protective" chivalry, while those of women might reflect a tendency toward self-denigration. Finally, type of assault and gender of respondent interact such that males blame the attacker more for a robbery, and less for rape, while females blame the attacker more for a rape, less for robbery. This interaction reverses directly the pattern of the type of assault by respondent gender interaction found with the global item, suggesting again that concern with social desirability may be stronger with the global item than the specific index. Males appear to be more willing to express a greater concern with robbery than rape, which is, after all, consistent with their greater actual vulnerability to robbery than to rape. Conversely, females appear to be more willing to express an equally reasonable greater concern with rape than with robbery.

Victim. Overall, 14.84% of the total blame was attributed to the victim. While this percentage of blame is clearly much less than that attributed to the attacker, these scripts are also heavily loaded toward blaming the attacker. Many of the experimental studies of this phenomenon have involved a victim of a nonsocial chance event, such as a disease or an accident. Those studies which have used a victim of a crime in which another person is an identifiable cause elicit much less victim blame.

There are several significant effects of assault variations on proportions of victim blaming. First, the victim is assigned much more blame when she is female than when male. Taken together with the greater degree of attacker blame for the assault of a male victim, the effect of social biases seems very evident. Second, the victim is blamed more when hitchhiking than jogging, an expected sign of social norms. Third, the victim is blamed more for a robbery than for a rape. Fourth, there is an intriguing three-way interaction among the genders of victims and respondents, and type of assault. Among rape scripts, male respondents blame the male and female victims roughly equally. Female respondents, however, blame female victims of rape strikingly more than they blame male victims. For robbery scripts, the degree of victim blaming is generally similar both by and about both genders, except that male respondents blame male victims of robbery much less. Again, this effect suggests the presence of self-denigration among the female respondents.

On the global measure, the attribution of blame to the victim averaged 3.22 on a 9 point scale. There were several significant effects for the assault variations. First, the victim is blamed significantly more

if a female than a male. Again, this gender difference is consistent with the stereotypes of women. Second, the victim is blamed more for hitchhiking than for jogging, an effect also consistent with social norms. Third, the victim is blamed more in a robbery than in a rape. Four, there is a three way interaction between type of assault and genders of victim and respondent such that while both female and male respondents blame the victim most when she is a woman and is robbed, female respondents blame female victims of both types of assault much more than they blame male victims. In fact, the victim blaming among female respondents with respect to a male rape victim is much less than that reported in any other cell.

There are five specific items which measure victim blaming; these include the victim's poor judgment, trusting nature, carelessness, passivity, and action of hitchhiking or jogging. The overall level of victim blame using this multi-item index is 3.68 on a 9 point scale. Reversing the measure differences for attacker blame, victim blame is higher on the index than on the global measure. This difference too can be explained by the low social desirability associated with blaming a victim. Presumably the index masks this effect more completely than does the global item.

The effects found with this index parallel those elicited by the global item. First, the victim is blamed more if a female than a male. Second, the victim is blamed more if hitchhiking than if jogging. Third, the victim is blamed more for a robbery than for a rape.

Society. Overall, 16,32% of the total blame was attributed to society. There were no effects for variation in assault. However, the parallel attribution of cause item yielded two interactions. First, female res-

pondents find society the cause more for rape, while male respondents find society to be the cause more for robbery, much less for rape. While this effect is consistent with the kind of offenses one would expect each gender to be most concerned about, it is important to note that the effect of perceived likelihood has already been accounted for. Second, while both female and male respondents attribute cause to social factors roughly equally, female respondents attribute the cause of assault to social factors much more strongly than do men when the victim is male.

On the global measure, the attribution of blame to social factors averages 4.96 on a 9 point scale. Several effects were found. First, society is blamed more for a robbery than for a rape. Second, type of assault and gender of respondent interact such that males blame society much more for a robbery than a rape, while females blame social factors roughly equivalently for the two types of assault. This interaction may reflect male respondents' concern with economic responsibilities.

There are five specific indicators of societal blame; these include the high unemployment rate, lack of enough police protection, a society in which people just don't care anymore, too much emphasis on sex/money in society, or male resentment of the women's movement, and a society which promotes male violence. The average degree of societal blame elicited by this index is 3.55 on a 9 point scale. As with attacker blame, the index elicits less blame than the global measure. The effects of assault variation parallel those found with the global measure. First, as above, society is blamed more for robbery than for rape. This persistent result may reflect a recent widespread awareness of the role of societal factors

in financial matters, as well as a general conception of rape as an isolated event unconnected to sex roles. Second, society is blamed more in general by males than by females. Third, as above, type of assault and gender of respondent interact such that female respondents blame social factors for rape and robbery equally, while male respondents blame social factors for robbery much more than for rape. Thus the awareness of the role of social factors in the economy cited under the first effect seems to be stronger among men than among women.

Fate. Overall, just 4.11% of the total blame was attributed to fate. No effects were found for the assault variations. There were three specific indicators of fate blame: pure chance, bad luck, and the victim's destiny. The overall level of fate blame averaged 2.56 on a 9 point scale. The multi-item index, like the division of percentage of blame item, elicited no significant effects of assault variations. (No global measures was used.)

Situation. Attributions of blame to situational factors were assessed neither in the division of blame item, nor on the global items. The three specific indicators of situation-blame were: the attacker's use of a weapon, the attacker's physical size, and the victim's being alone. The average level of situation blame was 5.16 on a 9 point scale. Only one significant effect was found. This was a threeway interaction among type of assault and genders of victims and of respondents such that while female respondents blame the situation a little more in the robbery of a female victim than in the other cells, male respondents blame the situation much less for rape of a male, much more for rape of a female, and about equally for robberies of both female and male victims. Presumably this effect reflects defensiveness in the instance of male response to the rape of a

male victim, and perhaps assumptions about female vulnerability in the instance of male response to the rape of a woman.

Conclusions

These results reported above sum to a persuasive argument that the social norms about appropriate behaviors for women and men, and the social stereotypes about the "nature" of women and men are powerful guides to attributions of blame for several types of victimization. A persistent gender effect emerges, directly in terms of blaming female victims more than male, and indirectly in terms of blaming the attacker more for assaulting a man than a woman. Moreover, this effect interacts with type of assault such that the attacker is blamed most for raping a man, least for raping a woman, a result clearly consistent with social stereotypes.

Certain behaviors too appear to reflect these biases. The attacker is blamed most severely for assaulting a man who is hitchhiking, for example, and least severely for assaulting a woman who is hitchhiking. The norms of appropriate independent behavior differ for women and men. These social stereotypes are reflected in differential reactions by female and male raters, as well. For example, women blame female rape victims much more than they blame male rape victims. Moreover, women blame male rape victims much less than do men, while men apparently do not exhibit the same cross-sex protectiveness, blaming female more than male rape victims as well. Women show other signs of internalized self-denigration in other ways. They blame the attacker more for robberies than for rapes, for example, while men reverse this trend. Women also blame the attacker more for assaulting a man, while this effect is reversed for male respondents.

An alternative argument proposed above suggested that respondents might blame same-sex more than opposite-sex victims, through defensiveness aroused by identification. If this identification effect were present, one would expect females to blame females more, and similarly, males to blame males more strongly. Instead, as noted above, while there are many indications that women blame women more strongly, males too blame female victims more than they do males. Women's internalization of low gender worth has apparently been all too successful.

With regard to other attributional outcomes, rape does seem to be taken seriously. Victims are blamed more for robberies than for rapes, and conversely attackers are blamed more for rapes than for robberies. However, the social meanings of these crimes are perceived rather differently. Thus society is blamed more for robbery than for rape; most of this effect appears to be due to male respondents who blame society for robbery much more than for rape. One explanation is that men are more concerned with the economic state of the country and perceive this as a social condition, and that they perceive this condition as related to the occurrence of robberies. Another explanation, however, is that rape is seen as an isolated act of deviant attackers rather than as a logical outcome and expression of social relationships.

In sum, the attributions of blame reported here are strikingly consistent with the social stereotypes and norms hypothesized to be influential antecedents. The next logical step in evaluating their influence is to measure respondents' social attitudes and norms prior to their attributions, and investigate whether these variables predict attributional patterns as expected. Such a study is currently underway.

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<u>Attributional Antecedents</u>	<u>Causal Factors</u>	<u>Causal Dimensions</u>	<u>Causal Effects</u>	<u>Behavioral Consequences</u>
Specific information	Ability	Stability	Expectancy shifts	Commission
Causal schemata	Effort	Locus		Intensity
Individual differences	Task factors	Intentionality	Affective reactions	Persistence
Reinforcement Schedules	Luck	(Generality)		Response rate
Others	Mood			Time to commission
	Others' attitudes			Resistance to extinction
	Others' personality			
	Fatigue			
	Other			

Figure 1. Weiner's Attributional Model

<u>% of blame attributed to the attacker</u>			<u>Do you think the attacker was to blame?</u>			<u>Four-item index of attacker blame</u>		
<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>
Overall	2.232	64.61%	Overall	1.869	7.88	Overall	2.034	5.89
Assault	6.447 (1,261)	Rape = 67.31 Rob = 61.76	Respondent	3.06	Female = 8.03	Assault	4.479	Rape = 6.0625
			Gender	(p=.081; 1,261)	Male = 7.80		(1,261)	Rob = 5.71
Situation	11.081	Jog = 69.44	Assault x	6.720	Male Rape =8.21	Respondent	4.886	Male =6.135
	(1,261)	Hitch = 59.92	Victim	(1,261)	Male Rob =7.94	Gender	(1,261)	Female=5.758
			Gender		Female Rob =7.92			
Respondent	6.326	Male = 67.97			Female Rape=7.51	Victim	3.467	Male =6.033
Gender	(1,261)	Female= 62.75	Assault x	4.315	Male,Rape =8.20	Gender	(1,261)	Female=5.753
Victim	5.015	Male = 66.24	Respondent	(1,261)	Female,Rob =7.98	Assault x	5.607	Male,Rob =6.21
Gender	(1,261)	Female= 63.01	Gender		Male,Rob =7.86	Respondent	(1,261)	Female,Rape=6.068
					Female,Rape=7.65	Gender		Male,Rape =6.055
								Female,Rob =5.418
			Situation x	3.164	Male Hitch =8.13			
			Victim	(1,261)	Male Jog =8.01	Respondent	10.645	Female Victim,
			Gender		Female Jog =7.96	Gender x	(1,261)	M Resp. =6.363
					Female Hitch=7.46	Victim		Male Victim,
						Gender		F Resp. =6.12
								Male Victim,
								M Resp. =5.848
								Female Victim,
								F Resp. =5.36

Table 1: Attributions of Blame to the Attacker^{1,2}

1. All effects significant at $\alpha = .05$ unless otherwise stated.
2. All analyses of variance were conducted with perceived general likelihood as a covariate.

<u>% of blame attributed to the victim</u>			<u>Do you think the victim was to blame?</u>			<u>Five-item index of victim blame</u>		
<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>
Overall	3.224	14.84%	Overall	3.719	3.22	Overall	5.539	3.68
Assault	7.578 (1,261)	Rob = 17.12 Rape = 12.69	Assault	6.827 (1,261)	Rob = 3.53 Rape = 2.93	Assault	4.073 (1,261)	Rob = 3.866 Rape = 3.512
Victim Gender	10.501 (1,261)	Female = 17.50 Male = 12.14	Victim Gender	7.181 (1,261)	Female = 3.56 Male = 2.88	Victim Gender	7.644 (1,261)	Female = 3.95 Male = 3.404
Situation	24.369 (1,261)	Hitch = 19.28 Jog = 10.28	Situation	27.604 (1,261)	Hitch = 3.84 Jog = 2.59	Situation	67.647 (1,261)	Hitch = 4.44 Jog = 2.906
Assault x Respondent	3.778 (1,261)	Female Respondents	Assault x Respondent	6.812 (1,261)	Female Respondents			
Gender x Victim Gender		Female Rob =20.02 Female Rape=17.28 Male Rob =16.35 Male Rape = 8.45	Gender x Victim Gender		Female Rob =3.90 Female Rape=3.74 Male Rob =3.51 Male Rape =2.22			
		Male Respondents			Male Respondents			
		Female Rob =20.23 Male Rape =13.75 Female Rape =12.76 Male Rob =11.50			Female Rob =3.73 Male Rape =3.31 Male Rob =2.86 Female Rape =2.79			

Table 2: Attributions of Blame to the Victim^{1,2}

1. All effects significant at $\alpha = .05$ unless otherwise stated.
2. All analyses of variance were conducted with perceived general likelihood as a covariate.

<u>% of blame attributed to society</u>			<u>Do you think society was to blame?</u>			<u>Five-item index of society blame</u>		
<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>
Overall	1.266	16.32%	Overall	2.226 (1,261)	4.96	Overall	1.883	3.55
No significant effects.			Assault	5.852 (1,261)	Rob = 5.28 Rape = 4.66	Assault	6.17 (1,261)	Rob = 3.772 Rape = 3.352
			Assault x Victim Gender	14.388 (1261)	Female Rob =5.73 Male Rape =5.16 Male Rob =4.87 Female Rape=4.22	Victim Gender	3.934 (1,261)	Male =3.818 Female=3.298
			Assault x Respondent Gender	5.842 (1,261)	Male,Rob =5.62 Female,Rob =5.08 Female,Rape=4.91 Male,Rape =4.18	Assault x Respondent Gender	6.86	Male,Rob =3.924 Female,Rob =3.682 Female,Rape=3.634 Male,Rape =2.812
<u>% of blame attributed to fate</u>						<u>Three-item index of fate blame</u>		
<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>	(Not asked about fate.)			<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>
Overall	1.266	4.11%				Overall	1.099	2.56
No significant effects.						No significant effects.		
						<u>Three-item index of situation blame</u>		
						Overall	1.799	5.16
			<u>Female Respondents</u>	<u>Male Respondents</u>		Assault x Respondent Gender x Victim Gender	7.984 (1,261)	
			Female Rob = 5.42	Female Rape=5.90				
			Male Rob = 5.10	Male Rob =5.107				
			Female Rape = 5.05	Female Rob =5.077				
			Male Rape = 4.95	Male Rape =3.73				

Table 3: Attributions of Blame to Society, Fate, and the Situation ^{1,2}

1. All effects significant at $\alpha = .05$ unless otherwise stated.
2. All analyses of variance were conducted with perceived general likelihood as a covariate.

Perceptions of Assault Likelihood

General Likelihood

<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>
Overall	6.617	5.896
Victim Gender	35.026	Female = 6.585 Male = 5.188
Assault	4.827	Rob = 6.156 Rape = 5.692
Assault x Victim Gender	5.752	Female Rape = 6.658 Female Rob = 6.609 Male Rob = 5.747 Male Rape = 4.597

Your own likelihood of assault

<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u>
Overall	2.566	4.268
Victim Gender	4.506	Male = 4.652 Female = 3.894
Assault	7.925	Rob = 4.763 Rape = 3.818

Other Perceptions of Assault

<u>Item</u>	<u>Effect</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Cell Means</u> (1-7 point scale)
Believable	Overall	1.627(NS)	1.779 (1 = believable)
Probable	Overall	1.064(NS)	5.05 (7 = probable)
Serious	Overall	2.772	1.60 (1 = serious)
	Assault	37.401	Rape = 1.31 Rob = 1.93
Important	Overall	2.118	6.104 (7 = important)
	Assault	17.312	Rape = 6.41 Rob = 5.77
Severe	Overall	2.595	1.986 (1 = severe)
	Assault	27.281	Rape = 1.62 Rob = 2.38
	Situation	3.606	Jog = 1.84 Hitch = 2.13
Attacker's Fault	Overall	1.164	2.043 (1 = attacker's fault)
<u>Not</u> Victim's Fault	Overall	3.029	2.611 (1 = not victim's fault)
	Assault		Rape = 2.27 Rob = 2.93
	Victim Gender		Male = 2.41 Female = 2.76
	Situation		Jog = 2.16 Hitch = 3.01